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CHAPTER 15 
Criminal Law, Procedure, and 
Administration 
EMIL SLIZEWSKI 
A. JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
§15.1. Criminal statutes: Construction. Regulatory statutes, per-
haps better known as public welfare offense statutes,l punishing the 
act with no mention of a culpable state of mind, have been before the 
Massachusetts courts several times in the past. Almost uniformly, the 
courts have read these statutes literally and have refused to require a 
scienter where none is set out in the legislation itself; in fact, the lack 
of a reasonable opportunity to know the existence of facts made the 
bases of such statutory crimes has been considered immaterial. 
A decision during the survey year, Commonwealth v. Lee} may be 
added to this line of cases involving statutory crimes without a mens 
rea. The defendant was charged with violating General Laws, Chapter 
94, Section 21 I, punishing any person "found in possession" of a "nar-
cotic drug" except "by reason of a physician's prescription lawfully 
and properly issued." A package, purportedly mailed by a certain 
person in New York, was delivered to the defendant by a mail carrier. 
Shortly after the package was handed over to the defendant, and before 
it was opened, police came on the scene and asked the defendant 
whether it was hers, to which she replied in the affirmative. It was 
opened by the defendant in the presence of the police and was found 
to contain marijuana. The defendant insisted that she had no prior 
knowledge of the contents and that she was being "framed." The 
address of the supposed sender, written on the parcel, proved to be a 
vacant lot in New York. 
The Supreme Judicial Court found no error in the trial court's re-
fusal to grant a motion for a directed verdict. It concluded that the 
defendant had physical control of and the intent to control the package 
and contents, thereby meeting the legal requirements of "possession." 
EMIL SLIZEWSKI is Associate Professor of Law at Boston College Law School and a 
member of the Massachusetts Bar. 
§15.1. 1 The phrase "public welfare offense" was first made popular by Francis B. 
Sayre in Public WeUare Offenses, 33 Col. L. Rev. 55 (1933). 
'1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 181, 117 N.E.2d 830. 
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The Court did not consider it important that the defendant might 
not have had reason to believe that there was marijuana in the pack-
age. Apparently, the result would have been the same even if the 
defendant had been "framed," provided that the police did not insti-
tute the scheme and thus give her the defense of entrapment. 
The fact that the defendant had no reasonable means of ascertain-
ing the contents of the package before accepting it from the mailman 
would not change the result in light of other decided cases.S Prob-
ably the best statement of the reason for construing a criminal statute 
of this nature so literally was made by Justice Holmes in Common-
wealth v. Smith: 
When according to common experience a certain fact generally 
is accompanied by knowledge of the further elements necessary 
to complete what it is the final object of the law to prevent, or 
even short of that, when it is desirable that people should find 
out whether the further elements are there, actual knowledge 
being a matter difficult to prove, the law may stop at the prelimi-
nary fact, and in pursuit of its policy may make the preliminary 
fact enough to constitute a crime.4 
To place on the prosecution the burden of proving scienter in the 
type of statute involved in the Lee case would make the statute largely 
nugatory. 
It could also be considered wise legislative policy to require persons 
to act at their peril in a matter which has an important connection 
with the restraint of illegal trafficking in drugs. Those who are will-
ful or negligent will be caught. That the nonculpable or careful may 
also be punished has been thought to be the necessary price to be paid 
for an effective and enforceable law. 
Because these statutes depart from the traditional common law con-
cept that every crime should require a mens rea, alarmed voices have 
spoken out against further extension of these no-fault crimes.5 It has 
been argued that to punish the "innocent" not only conflicts with pre-
vailing morals but also brings disrespect on the law. Be that as it 
may, these strict liability crimes ilre now so deeply rooted in our 
law that the present-day courts seem less ready to rationalize their 
existence than in the past. 
If the final object of the law is to punish those who knowingly 
possess narcotics and not those who lack scienter or the reasonable 
3 Commonwealth v. Mixer, 207 Mass. 141, 93 N.E. 249, 31 L.R.A. (N.s.) 467 (1910); 
Commonwealth v. New York Central & Hudson River R.R. Co., 202 Mass. 394, 88 
N.E. 764, 23 L.R.A. (N.S.) 350 (1909); Commonwealth v. Smith, 166 Mass. 370, 44 
N.E. 503 (1896); Commonwealth v. Mash, 7 Metc. 472 (Mass. 1843). 
• 166 Mass. 370, 375, 376; 44 N.E. 503, 504 (1896). 
• Hall, Principles of Criminal Law, c. 10 (1947); Felton v. United States, 96 U.S. 
699, 703, 24 L. Ed. 875, 876 (1877); Hall, Prolegomena to a Science of Criminal Law, 
89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 549 (1941); Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Col. L. Rev. 55, 
78·83 (1933). 
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means of acquiring knowledge, it would seem possible to do so and 
still have an effective regulatory statute by giving the state the benefit 
of prima facie evidence that possession is accompanied by knowledge 
and placing upon the accused the burden of proving lack of knowl-
edge or of the reasonable means of acquiring knowledge. One court 
at least has taken such an approach in construing a similar statute,6 
but such action by a court may be subject to the criticism that it was 
taking part in judicial legislation.7 
Since cases like Lee and Commonwealth v. Mixer 8 may conflict with 
the sense of justice of a large segment of the public, it might be well 
for the legislature to consider the use of statutory presumptions or 
prima facie evidence in enacting further or amending present public 
welfare offense statutes in order to have a significant part of our law 
conform to the community's general conception of what is fair and 
just. In view of such statutes as the bad check law,9 it would be a far 
from novel experiment for the legislature. 
When the courts consider statutes similar to the one in issue in the 
Lee case, they very infrequently fall back on the canon that criminal 
statutes are to be construed strictly (i.e., favorably for the accused). 
This canon of construction together with its close relative the ejusdem 
generis rule is, of course, to be used only as a guidepost in ascertain-
ing the "intent" of the legislature in enacting the statute in question.1° 
§15.2. Void for vagueness: Unnatural and lascivious acts. During 
the survey year the Supreme Judicial Court was called upon to de-
clare two statutes unconstitutional under the void for vagueness rule. 
In Jaquith v. Commonwealth 1 the accused was charged with violating 
General Laws, Chapter 272, Section 35: "Whoever commits any un-
natural and lascivious act with another person shall be punished ... " 
He contended that, due to the vagueness of the statute, there was a 
violation of Article XII of the Declaration of Rights and the due proc-
ess clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The statute is in the conjunctive; the act must be "unnatural and 
lascivious" to come within its prohibition: apparently a natural and 
lascivious act is not punishable under this particular statute, nor 
• Rex v. Ewart, 25 N.Z.L.R. 709 (1905). See also the approach of the courts in 
criminal libel cases: Commonwealth v. Morgan, 107 Mass. 199 (1871); People v. 
Fuller, 238 Ill. 116, 87 N.E. 336 (1909); State v. Mason, 26 Ore. 273, 38 Pac. 130 (1894). 
• Compare Nigro v. United States, 4 F.2d 781 (8th Cir. 1925); Tenement House 
Dept. v. McDevitt, 215 N.Y. 160, 109 N.E. 88 (1915). 
8207 Mass. HI, 93 N.E. 249, 31 L.R.A. (N.S.) 467 (1910). 
• G.L., c. 266, §37, amended by Acts of 1937, c. 99. 
10 In Commonwealth v. Carlson, 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 509, 120 N.E.2d 384, the Court 
refused to apply the ejusdem generis rule and the canon of strict construction when 
it held that being found in the hallway of a building with a device for registering 
bets was in violation of a statute punishing one who was "found in, any place, way, 
public or private, park or parkway, or any open space, public or priva~e, or any 
portion thereof" with apparatus or devices for registering bets. 
§15.2. 11954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 497, 120 N.E.2d 189. 
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would an unnatural but not lascivious act be prohibited. If the 
emphasis is to be placed on the conjunctive and on the meaning of 
the word "unnatural," if "unnatural" qualifies "lascivious," it may 
be possible to analogize the Jaquith case with Commonwealth v. Car-
penter,2 where the Court struck down a statute punishing persons who 
"wilfully and unreasonably . . . saunter or loiter for more than seven 
minutes after being directed by a police officer to move on." Since 
all idling was not prohibited, but only unreasonable failure to obey 
a direction to move on by a policeman, the Court held that the statute 
was void because of "its failure to prescribe any standard capable of 
intelligent human evaluation to enable one chargeable with its viola-
tion to discover those conditions which convert conduct which is prima 
facie lawful into that which is criminal." 3 The distinction between 
reasonable and unreasonable sauntering or loitering was too tenuous 
a distinction for the person of average intelligence to make. If that is 
so, should the same model man be able to know with any more certi-
tude the difference between natural and lascivious and unnatural and 
lascivious conduct? 
It would seem that such a verbal skirmish is not helpful. The more 
realistic approach, and the one that Court took, would be to determine 
whether the words "unnatural and lascivious act" in the juxtaposition 
in which they actually appear in the contested legislation have a com-
mon usage which indicates with a reasonable degree of clarity the kind 
of conduct prohibited. To dissect a statutory phrase and speculate 
on the possible meaning of every word, in and out of context, would 
merely lead to the recognition that many statutes contain the am-
biguity that attends the use of an imperfect means of communication, 
the English language. The test should not necessarily be the difficulty 
of applying the statute.4 The reports are full of annoying problems 
of statutory construction where the legislature does not expressly pro-
scribe the litigated activity, but such difficulty in application does not 
of itself render a statute void. 
General terms in a criminal statute do not automatically place it 
beyond constitutional limits, since "it is not infrequent that prescribed 
conduct is incapable of precise legal definition." 5 The type of con-
duct that the legislature desired to proscribe in the Jaquith case prob-
ably could have been made more precise,6 but this should not be the 
sole determinant under the void for vagueness rule. Such general 
statutory descriptions of crimes as the following have been upheld: 
coercing a licensee of a radio station to employ more persons than the 
number "needed ... to perform actual services";7 the failure to ex-
ercise "all reasonable care to avoid or prevent injury through collision 
• 325 Mass. 519, 91 N.E.2d 666 (1950). 
• 325 Mass. at 523, 91 N.E.2d at 668. 
• United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1,67 Sup. Ct. 1538,91 L. Ed. 1877 (1947). 
"1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 497, 499, 120 N.E.2d 189, 191. 
• See New York Penal Law, c. 41, art. 66, §690. 
• United States v. Petrillo, 332 u. S. 1,67 Sup. Ct. 1538,91 L. Ed. 1877 (1947). 
4
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with all other persons and vehicles ... ";8 "crime involving moral 
turpitude";9 mailing an "obscene, lascivious, lewd, or filthy" article.1° 
The general words and phrases which are identical with the well-
established standards of the community should be considered suffi-
ciently defined to meet due process requirements. In the Jaquith case 
the Court said that the sense of decency, propriety, and morality, as 
well as the common sense of the community, would be sufficient to 
decide what acts were proscribed.ll 
Since the indictment was drafted in terms of the statute, which the 
Court thought sufficiently definite, it was an adequate basis for the 
defendant's preparation of his case, and thus, there was no violation 
of Article XII of the Declaration of Rights. Moreover, it would seem 
that the accused was entitled to a bill of particulars setting out the 
essential details of the crime as a matter of right under General Laws, 
Chapter 277, Section 40. Nor was there any violation of due process 
of law on the ground that the crime lacked sufficient certainty to 
permit effective former jeopardy pleas, the Court pointing out that 
a defendant may resort to the record and even to parol evidence to 
show what facts supported a prior conviction_ 
§15.3. Void for vagueness: Defective delinquent statutes. As a re-
sult of Petition of O'Learyl and Ex parte Tardiff2 the Massachusetts 
legislature enacted Chapter 645 of the Acts of 1953 providing for the 
observation, examination, and recommitment of certain persons whose 
original commitment had been found to be procedurally improper. 
This act provides that if such a person is found to be mentally defec-
tive, certain prescribed notice is to be given and a hearing is to be 
held for his commitment to a defective delinquent department, and 
that 
If after a hearing and examination of the person's record, 
character and personality, the court finds that such person has 
shown himself to be dangerous or shows a tendency toward be-
coming such, that such tendency is or may become a menace to 
the public and that such person is not a proper subject for the 
school for the feebleminded or commitment as an insane person, 
the court shall make a report of the finding to the effect that the 
person is a defective delinquent and may commit him to a depart-
ment for defective delinquents. 
The constitutionality of this statute was attacked by a petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus against the superintendent of the State Farm 
8 State v. Magaha, 182 Md. 122, 32 A.2d 477 (1943). 
• Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223. 71 Sup. Ct. 703. 95 L. Ed. 886 (1950), where the 
Court applied the void for vagueness rule to a deportation statute because of the 
serious nature of deportation. 
10 Coomer v. United States. 213 Fed. 1 (8th Cir. 1914). 
11 Cf. State v. Vallery. 212 La. 1095. 34 So.2d 329 (1948). 
§15.3. '325 Mass. 179.89 N.E.2d 769 (1950). 
• 328 Mass. 265, 103 N.E.2d 265 (1952). 
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§15.3 CRIMINAL LAW 157 
at Bridgewater by one who had been committed for observation ac-
cording to the terms of the statute in Ex parte Dubois.3 It was con-
tended that the statutory reference to a "mental defective" and to one 
who is "dangerous or shows a tendency toward becoming such, that 
such tendency is or may become a menace to the public," comes within 
the void for vagueness doctrine, and that because of the uncertainty 
and indefiniteness of the act there was an improper delegation of legis-
lative powers to courts and juries in conflict with Article XXX of 
the Declaration of Rights. 
The Court upheld the legislation, emphasizing that it was not a 
criminal statute, there being no definition of a crime or imposition of 
any punishment. It was a matter of the legislature acting in its role 
of parens patriae in caring for mentally deficient persons in the state. 
This being so, the criteria of definiteness of criminal statutes to avoid 
a due process objection would not be determinative, and the standards 
of certainty required may not be as great. One of the fundamental 
reasons for the requirement of definiteness and clarity of criminal 
statutes is to notify persons of the illegality of prospective activity so 
that such notice will permit them to avoid the prohibited acts. The 
Dubois case, however, does not involve the prohibition of any volun-
tary acts but concerns the involuntary condition of a person as a kind 
of "mental defective." 4 
A noncriminal statute should at least be sufficiently definite to serve 
as a guide to its administration. The Court felt that the persons made 
subject to the provisions of the act are described by language readily 
understood by those who may be called upon by it to make adjudi-
cations under it. Since there is a practical and reasonable standard to 
guide the courts, the act does not provide for an unlawful delegation 
of powers. 
Although a statute may be somewhat indefinite on its face, it has 
been held that judicial construction may adequately limit the scope 
of the legislation by way of a further definition of the statutory terms.5 
In the Dubois case the Court defined a mental defective as one whose 
mentality is less than normal, which is still further qualified by the 
statutory requirement that he be dangerous or have a tendency toward 
becoming a menace to the public. 
Despite the petitioner'S insistence in the Dubois case that the con-
finement under the statute is the equivalent to a sentence or a penalty 
for a crime and that criteria involving criminal statutes should be 
followed, the Court considered the object of the legislation to be 
fundamentally that of treatment.6 A query might be made whether 
the petitioner's case would not have been strengthened if the 1954 
81954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 657, 120 N.E.2d 920. 
• Cf. Minnesota ex reI. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 309 U.S. 270, 60 
Sup. Ct. 523, 84 L. Ed. 744 (1940). 
5 Ibid. See also Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 514, 68 Sup. Ct. 665, 669, 92 
L. Ed. 840, 849 (1948). 
6 Compare Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 71 Sup. Ct. 743,95 L. Ed. 886 (1950). 
6
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amendment to the defective delinquent statute were in force when the 
case was decided; Chapter 685 of the Acts of 1954 would require that 
a person be charged with a crime involving danger to life or limb 
before an application for commitment to the department for defective 
delinquents may be filed. 
§15.4. Right to counsel and opportunity to defend. In the survey 
year the Supreme Judicial Court considered two cases involving the 
right of the accused to have the effective assistance of counsel. In the 
first, Jones v. Commonwealth} it was decided that although there is 
no right to have counsel assigned to defend the accused in all types 
of criminal cases, due process of law requires minimally a reasonable 
opportunity to obtain counsel and to prepare a defense. 
In Lindsey v. Commonwealth2 the Court was asked by way of a writ 
of error to reverse two concurrent sentences for incest and carnal 
knowledge of a female child under the age of sixteen. The petitioner 
was arrested on March 1, 1949, and remained in custody at the county 
jail until March 21. On March 15 he was indicted and arraigned, 
and he pleaded not guilty. On Friday, March 18, his cases were on the 
daily trial list and were sent out of the first session to the third session, 
but it did not appear that the petitioner knew that his cases were 
assigned to this session. Late that same afternoon he consulted with 
counsel from the Voluntary Defenders Committee and told him that 
the cases would be reached the next Monday. Counsel promised that 
he would attempt to get a continuance. When counsel went to the 
Superior Court the following Monday, he discovered that the cases 
were not on the daily trial list, and he then left the court house after 
instructing an associate to try to obtain a continuance. A little later 
the associate discovered that the petitioner's cases had commenced in 
the third session, and when he arrived he asked for a continuance. 
The trial judge, referring to the fact that a jury had been impaneled, 
said it was too late for a continuance but allowed the associate a short 
time to confer with the accused. The associate represented the accused 
at the trial, cross-examining witnesses and arguing to the jury. 
The Court reversed the sentences, saying, "The ground of this de-
cision is that the petitioner was deprived of due process of law because 
an unfortunate combination of circumstances prevented him from 
having the benefit on an important occasion of the services of counsel 
whom he himself had secured within three days of his indictment to 
represent him on that occasion." 3 The Court thought it would make 
no difference that the representative of the Voluntary Defenders Com-
mittee did not undertake to defend the accused completely, finding 
that there was at least a commitment on the part of counsel of the 
Voluntary Defenders to move for a continuance. Since there was 
found to be no reasonable opportunity to make an investigation of 
§15.4. 11954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 185, 117 N.E.2d 820. 
• 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1, 116 N.E.2d 691. 
81954 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 4, 116 N.E.2d at 693. 
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§15.4 CRIMINAL LAW 159 
the case, the Court concluded that representation by counsel on the 
matter of a continuance was of substantial importance. Even though 
the accused was represented by counsel at the trial, there was a viola-
tion of due process because his attorney, due to lack of an opportunity 
to investigate and prepare the case, could not render adequate legal 
services. 
Only three days elapsed between the date of indictment and arraign-
ment and the petitioner's acquisition of legal services from the Vol-
untary Defenders Committee. On the other hand, the petitioner was 
arrested for these crimes more than two weeks previously and a lawyer 
employed for his defense shortly thereafter would have had a reason-
able opportunity to investigate the case and prepare a defense before 
the date of trial. The Voluntary Defenders Committee does not come 
into any case until it reaches the Superior Court, but it seems doubtful 
that this should control; for it has been decided that there is no con-
stitutional obligation imposed upon the state to appoint counsel to 
represent indigent defendants in noncapital cases unless special cir-
cumstances are present, such as youth, ignorance, lack of familiarity 
with criminal proceedings, complexity of issues, unfair conduct on 
the part of public officials, or, generally, some incapacity or preju-
dice which would make the trial of the defendant without counsel 
unfair.4 
If the Voluntary Defenders Committee had not come to the aid of 
the petitioner, there might well have been no deprivation of due proc-
ess when the accused was tried and convicted on March 21. Further, 
there might not have been a violation of the due process clause if the 
trial had been postponed for two weeks after arraignment and the 
accused had acquired services of counsel for the first time the day 
before the date set for trial; there at least would have been an op-
portunity to acquire counsel, who probably would have had sufficient 
time to investigate and prepare the case. It is to be doubted that an 
unreasonable delay by a defendant in employing a lawyer to defend 
him should force the court into the position of having to grant a 
continuance to permit effective representation by counsel, for this 
could lead to long undesirable delays and indirectly place docket and 
calendar control in the hands of a defendant. 
However, it is to be noted that in the Lindsey case only three days 
elapsed from the date of indictment to the time when the petitioner 
obtained counsel. The date of arrest eighteen days previously should 
be of less significance because there had to be further action by the 
grand jury before it became certain that the petitioner would have to 
stand trial and require the services of an attorney. Moreover, the 
practice of the Voluntary Defenders of appearing only in Superior 
Court and the fact that the accused could not afford services of paid 
• Allen v. Commonwealth. 324 Mass. 558. 87 N.E.2d 192 (1949); Betts v. Brady. 316 
U.S. 455. 62 Sup. Ct. 1252. 86 L. Ed. 1595 (1941); Bute v. Illinois. 333 U.S. 640. 68 
Sup. Ct. 763. 92 L. Ed. 986 (1948); Gibbs v. Burke. 337 U.S. 773. 69 Sup. Ct. 1247. 93 
L. Ed. 1686 (1949). 
8
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counsel could be significant if not controlling factors on the issue of 
delay in acqUIring counsel. 
§15.5. Fair trial: Duty of the district attorney. A district attorney, 
although obliged to present the strongest case the state might have 
against a person accused of a crime, cannot always assume a completely 
partisan role. The American Bar Association in Canon 5 of its 
Canons of Professional Ethics, 1948, takes the position that "The pri-
mary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecutions is not to convict, 
but to see that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the secret-
ing of witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused 
is highly reprehensible." The courts have reversed convictions where 
overenthusiastic prosecutors have procured them by such acts as the 
Canons prohibit.1 
In Smith v. Commonwealth2 the Court considered the conduct of 
a district attorney which fell short of what the American Bar Associa-
tion deems "highly reprehensible," but which the Court indicated 
might be the basis for the reversal of a conviction. The accused had 
been convicted of breaking and entering a building in the nighttime 
and larceny therefrom and sued out a writ of error to reverse the 
judgment. A single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court reserved 
and reported the case to the full bench. 
At the trial in Superior Court, the prosecution had relied heavily 
upon a confession of the petitioner which was in great detail and 
which recited certain facts attending the commission of the crime that 
the police did not know but which they later verified. Long before 
the trial this confession was repudiated by the petitioner, who insisted 
that the only reason he made it was to avoid severe punishment in 
Maine, where he was jailed awaiting trial for a crime; that it was just 
an attempt to get the Massachusetts authorities to bring him to this 
state; and that the minute details of the Massachusetts crime were 
obtained from a fellow prisoner in the Maine jail. 
A few months before the trial, the district attorney received from 
the petitioner several letters and affidavits having a substantial tend-
ency to prove that the petitioner was out of Massachusetts on the day 
that the crime was committed. Acting in good faith and influenced 
greatly by the precise details in the confession, the district attorney 
made no investigation of the truth of the matters alleged in these letters 
and affidavits, but tried the case without bringing them to the atten-
tion of the trial judge. The Superior Court, on objection of the 
prosecuting attorney, excluded most of these letters and affidavits as 
hearsay when they were offered as evidence by the petitioner. In his 
brief the petitioner alleged that he was without counsel at the trial, 
but this did not appear in the record. 
§15.5. 1 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 55 Sup. Ct. 629, 79 L. Ed. 1314 
(1935); People v. Riley, 191 Misc. 888, 83 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1949), noted in 62 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1234 (1949); Mooney v. Holahan, 294 U.S. 103, 110-113,55 Sup. Ct. 340,341,342, 
79 L. Ed. 791, 793, 794 (1935). 
• 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 677, 121 N.E.2d 707. 
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The Supreme Judicial Court, having examined these letters and 
affiqavits as exhibits, found that they had a strong tendency to prove 
that the petitioner was not in the state at the time the crime was com-
mitted and stated that it believed that the matters alleged therein 
could have been put in evidence by deposition or otherwise. How-
ever, since the record did not indicate whether the petitioner was 
represented by counsel or refer to the conduct of the trial judge, the 
Court recommitted the case for further findings by the single justice. 
The Court declared that, in view of the strong probability that the 
petitioner was in another state when the crime was committed, the 
issue of alibi ought to have been put to the jury fully and squarely; 
that in certain circumstances it may be the duty of the prosecuting 
attorney to apprise the court of facts detrimental to the state's case. 
If the accused was not represented by counsel during the trial, the 
Court suggests that the district attorney might then have to acquaint 
the court with this important evidence. Furthermore, the lack of 
defendant's counsel may determine the amount of intervention by the 
trial judge necessary to safeguard the accused's right to a fair trial.3 
It would appear to be undesirable to place any rigid duty on the 
district attorney to investigate all leads which favor the accused's case. 
In the Smith case the Court emphasized the substantial nature, and 
apparently creditable sources of the letters and affidavits and an-
nounced: "It is well understood that the duty of a district attorney 
is not merely to secure convictions. It is his duty to secure them with 
due regard to the constitutional and other rights of the defendant. 
[Citations omitted.] It may even become his duty in some circum-
stances to direct the attention of the court to evidence favorable to 
the defendant." 4 The Court then expressed its reluctance to formu-
late any hard and fast rule setting out the obligations of the prosecut-
ing attorneys in such matters. 
The district attorney could not have doubted that the petitioner 
was relying on the defense of alibi and that the petitioner expected 
him to verify the documents and the facts contained in them before 
it was decided to prosecute the indictment. Of course, the petitioner 
had no right to have the district attorney enter a nolle prosequi, that 
matter being in the sole and complete discretion of the prosecutor.5 
If the district attorney comes into possession of important material 
evidence tending to prove the innocence of the petitioner from a 
source other than the petitioner himself, it has been indicated that 
it would be his duty to disclose it.6 "When there is substantial room 
for doubt, the prosecution is not to decide for the court what is ad-
3 Cf. Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773, 69 Sup. Ct. 1247, 93 L. Ed. 1686 (1949); Allen 
v. Commonwealth, 324 Mass. 558, 87 N.E.2d 192 (1949). 
• 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 667, 682, 121 N.E.2d 707, 710. 
5 Attorney General v. Tufts, 239 Mass. 458, 131 N.E. 573 (1921); Commonwealth v. 
Wakelin, 230 Mass. 567, 120 N.E. 209 (1918). 
6 See Griffin v. United States, 183 F.2d 990, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Jordon v. Bondy, 
114 F.2d 599, 602 (D.C. Cir. 1940). 
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missible, or for the defense what is useful." 7 In the Smith case, how-
ever, it was the petitioner who supplied the district attorney wit~ the 
important information relating to the alleged crime, and if he had 
been represented by counsel at the trial, it would seem doubtful that 
it would have been a reversible error for the district attorney to fail 
to call it to the court's attention.s But the petitioner did not have 
counsel and when he made known the information to the prosecutor 
he expected him to act thereon. Nondisclosure of such facts season-
ably by the district attorney could be held to be such narrow partisan-
ship as to conflict with his broader public duty.9 
It is not to be expected that the court would require that the district 
attorney make a detailed investigation of the matter of the affidavits. 
The affiants lived in Illinois and Indiana, and it may be doubted that 
the budget of the district attorney's office would cover such out-of-
state investigations.10 The efficient and orderly administration of his 
office could be seriously affected by a rule that would require him to 
weigh and investigate the strength of the defendant's case as well as 
the state's. After all, the prosecuting attorney in the Smith case had 
a very complete confession, and a confession, though unsupported by 
corroborating evidence, may establish guilt under Massachusetts law.ll 
Assuming that the district attorney had seasonably divulged the 
nature and the contents of the documents in his possession, the require-
ments of a fair trial of the unrepresented petitioner might have obliged 
the trial judge to appoint counsel to defend the accused or, in the 
alternative, the judge would have had to playa more active role into 
seeing that the jury had the opportunity to consider fully these matters 
bearing on alibi.12 
In Aronson v. Commonwealth13 the Court was urged to reverse a 
conviction, it being alleged that the police knew that the principal 
witness for the Commonwealth was telling a false story and that there 
was a denial of due process when the prosecuting officer introduced 
such false testimony. The Court, after announcing that there was 
nothing that raised the question in the petition for a writ of error, 
went on to point out that the petitioner expressly disclaimed any im-
proper conduct on the part of the district attorney or members of 
his staff. The Court declared, "It would certainly be difficult to en-
force the criminal law if all convictions were to be subject to subse-
quent inquiry as to what 'the police' knew or believed about the truth 
• Griffin v. United States, supra, note 6. 
8 However, if the lawyer is grossly incompetent, there may be a lack of adequate 
representation and a fair trial. United States ex reI. Hall v. Ragan, 60 F. Supp. 
820 (N.D. Ill. 1945). 
• Melanson v. O'Brien, 191 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1951). 
10 G.L., c. 12, §24. 
11 Commonwealth v. Kimball, 321 Mass. 290 73 N.E.2d ~68 (1947); Commonwealth 
v. DiStasio, 294 Mass. 273, 1 N.E.2d 89 (1936). 
12 See Allen v. Commonwealth, 324 Mass. 558, 87 N.E.2d 192 (1949). 
13 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 695, 121 N.E.2d 669. 
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of the evidence. We are not aware of any decisions going to that 
length." 14 
§15.6. Scope of the writ of error. The old common law writ of 
error was a very limited appellate remedy. It reviewed only those 
errors which were apparent on the record, including merely the war-
rant, complaint, or indictment and other pleadings, the verdict, judg-
ment, sentence, and some few entries made by the clerk. It was an 
unsatisfactory mode of review not only because of its close tie to the 
record, but also because the appellate court took no notice of errors 
of fact which went to the innocence of the defendant. The writ of 
error coram nobis permitted to some extent a court's consideration 
of alleged errors of fact. However, in light of General Laws, Chapter 
250, Section 9, the writ of error coram nobis has become obsolete. 
Today, in Massachusetts, the writ lies even though the petitioner 
may have an alternative remedy of appeal, and will be issued as a 
matter of course in cases of misdeameanors not tried with a felony. 
In all other cases, whether the accused may sue out a writ of error 
rests on the sound discretion of a single justice of the Supreme Judicial 
Court.1 Unlike the other ways available to review a conviction, the 
writ of error is an original and independent action,2 and it may be 
brought at any time after judgment. 
During the survey year the Supreme Judicial Court reviewed on a 
writ of error cases where the petitioner claimed that he had been de-
prived of the right to effective representation by counselor was denied 
the opportunity to prepare a defense;3 where the petitioner alleged 
that he was deprived of a fair trial by improper activity by the prose-
cuting attorney;4 where the petitioner was convicted under a statute 
contended to be void for vagueness.5 
It is obvious that under General Laws, Chapter 250, Section 9, 
errors of fact may be reviewed by a writ of error, but there has been 
some uncertainty with respect to the kind of fact situations which 
may be considered on review. In Aronson v. Commonwealth 6 the 
petitioner alleged error in that a principal witness for the Common-
wealth in an abortion prosecution contradicted and repudiated her 
testimony given at the trial, when she appeared, more than a year 
later, before the Board of Registration in Medicine. The Court ex-
pressed its reluctance to review the alleged error on the ground that 
errors of fact reviewable on a writ of error do not include possible 
errors which may have occurred in the determination of facts at the 
u 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 698, 121 N.E.2d at 672. 
§15.6. 'G.L., c. 250, §11; id., c. 278, §§33A-33G, amended by Acts of 1954, c. 187. 
See Section 15.7 intra. 
2 Jaquith v. Commonwealth, 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 497, 120 N.E.2d 189. 
3 Jones v. Commonwealth, 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 185, 117 N.E.2d 820; Lindsey v. 
Commonwealth, 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1, 116 N.E.2d 691. 
• Smith v. Commonwealth, 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 677, 121 N.E.2d 707. 
5 Jaquith v. Commonwealth, 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 497, 120 N.E.2d 189. 
• 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 695, 121 N.E.2d 669. 
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trial. The petitioner had a sufficient opportunity to litigate the facts 
at the trial on the merits and if such facts were reviewable, "it would 
always be competent for a party, against whom a judgment is ren-
dered, to sue out a writ of error, and assign for error, that the facts 
on which the judgment proceeded were not true, and thus obtain a \ 
new trial." Although a motion for a new trial would seem to lie when 
the principal witness later repudiated her testimony, it was not avail-
able to the petitioner because more than a year had elapsed before 
the repudiation was made. The Court thought this should not extend 
the scope of the writ of error. 
Where this new development occurred beyond the one-year period 
and involved something more than mere cumulative evidence, going to 
the very core of the Commonwealth's case, it seems unfortunate that a 
new trial could not be granted. Whether the petitioner used an 
instrument on the body of the witness with the intent to procure a 
miscarriage was in issue at the trial in Superior Court, but the con-
tradictory statements by this principal witness before the trial jury 
and before another agency were not facts litigated there, nor was the 
failure of the petitioner to place the repudiating testimony in litiga-
tion due to his failure to take advantage of the opportunity to do so. 
Of course, whether a motion for a new trial for newly discovered 
evidence will be allowed rests on the discretion 'of the trial judge; so, 
too, in the Aronson case should the application for a writ of error be 
addressed to the discretion of a single justice of the Supreme Judicial 
Court, since the case was tried subject to the provisions of General 
Laws, Chapter 278, Sections 33A-33G.7 The Court in the Aronson 
case declared that not only was there lacking an abuse of discretion 
on the part of the single justice but also that as a matter of law the 
writ could not have issued. 
If newly discovered evidence would sustain a motion for a new trial 
provided the new facts came to light within a year, it may be in the 
interest of justice to have such new facts considered and weighed by 
some other available remedy if the year has expired. In light of the 
Massachusetts statutory system of appellate review of criminal cases, 
the only possible way to prevent substantial injustice in such a case 
might be to permit a review by way of a writ of error, buttressed per-
haps by the general superintending power given the Supreme Judicial 
Court by General Laws, Chapter 211, Section 3. It may be policy 
of doubtful merit to place major restrictions on the efficacy of the writ 
of error where there is a substantial threat that an innocent person 
has been convicted. 
On the other hand, one of the most important considerations in the 
interest of the effective administration of the criminal law is the prac-
tical policy favoring the ultimate termination of cases. The legis-
lature in the interest of finality of convictions limited the time within 
which a motion for a new trial could be brought to one year. It may 
7 G .L., c. 250, §ll. 
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be objected that there would be a circumvention of this legislative 
policy if a new trial might be granted by way of a writ of error for 
the same reasons that would have supported a motion for a new trial. 
Yet it appears that such grounds as the purposeful misconduct of a 
district attorney, the denial of a fair trial, and, generally, the denial 
of due process of law would support a motion for a new trial;8 and 
the Massachusetts Court has entertained a writ of error in cases in-
volving these grounds, even though more than a year separated the 
conviction and the bringing of the writ.9 
The interest in the finality of convictions should not take precedence 
over the requirements of procedural due process. On the other hand, 
if a fair trial has been held and the fact issues have been litigated by 
the introduction of evidence then available, a relitigation of the fact 
issues as new important evidence turns up in later years would make 
the balancing of the policy favoring termination of judgments and the 
goal of convicting only the guilty more difficult to achieve. The law 
cannot guarantee scientific accuracy of its judgments. The innocent 
may have to resort to executive clemency. 
B. LEGISLATION 
§15.7. Appeals. Before 1954, General Laws, Chapter 278, Sections 
33A-33G provided for an appeal in a case of murder or manslaughter, 
or other felony made subject to the statute by a judge of the Superior 
Court, on a summary of the record, assignment of errors, claim of 
appeal, and a transcript of the evidence. Chapter 187 of the Acts 
of 1954 broadens the scope of the type of criminal case which may be 
appealed under General Laws, Chapter 278, Sections 33A-33G, to all 
felony cases, and misdemeanors tried with felonies. 
Until this new act was passed, the failure to provide for the taking 
of evidence by a stenographer in some serious criminal cases, while 
stenographers were present in minor tort actions, was a basis of criti-
cism. Chapter 187 makes it mandatory that a typewritten transcript 
of the evidence be prepared in all above-mentioned cases where the 
defendant takes an appeal. It is to be noted, however, that, since 
all felonies or misdemeanors tried with felonies are now subject to 
General Laws, Chapter 278, Sections 33A-33G, review by a bill of ex-
ceptions is no longer permitted;1 nor maya writ of error be issued 
as a matter of course to review such cases, but only after a single jus-
tice of the Supreme Judicial Court allows it.2 
It has been suggested that the mandatory aspect of the new act may 
8 Id., c. 278, §29; Commonwealth v. Sacco, 255 Mass. 369, 456, 151 N.E. 839 (1926). 
• Jones v. Commonwealth, 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 185, 117 N.E.2d 830; Smith v. Com-
monwealth, 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 677, 121 N.E.2d 707; Lindsey v. Commonwealth, 1954 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 1, 116 N.E.2d 691. 
§15.7. 1 G.L., c. 278, §31. 
2 Id., c. 250, §11. 
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be unduly burdensome to the Supreme Judicial Court and to the ap-
pellant.3 
§15.8. Interlocutory reports. Until the 1954 session of the legisla-
ture, only in civil cases could questions of law be reported before trial 
to the Supreme Judicial Court. Despite the enormity of the errors, 
the defendant in a criminal case had to await the expiration of the 
trial and conviction before he could seek a review of errors by the 
Supreme Judicial Court. Thus, the defendant might have been tried 
by a court entirely without jurisdiction, under a defective indictment, 
or under an unconstitutional statute, with resulting delay and heavy 
expense for both the accused and the Commonwealth. On the other 
hand, to give the defendant the right to have the court of review 
consider alleged errors before trial could readily lead to indiscrimi-
nate appeals and delays with the resultant waste if the defendant were 
not successful. 
In the Twenty-eighth Report of the Judicial Council of Massa-
chusetts! it was recommended that a judge of the Superior Court be 
permitted to bring a question of law before the full bench of the 
Supreme Judicial Court by an interlocutory report in criminal cases. 
Chapter 528 of the Acts of 1954 permits a report of a question of law 
before trial in a criminal case "in the interest of justice" if, "in the 
opinion of the presiding justice, [it] is so important or doubtful as 
to require the decision of the supreme judicial court." 
This act would seem to avoid the objections attending the auto-
matic right to have interlocutory matters reviewed and the require-
ment that there cannot be a review of such matters until a conviction. 
It would be an unusual case, involving a doubtful question of law, 
which would be reported to the Supreme Judicial Court under this 
act. 
§15.9. Business entries. For several years Massachusetts has had a 
statute permitting, in civil cases, the admission of certain entries in 
the regular course of business over any objection that they were hear-
say, self-serving, or transcribed.! The reasons for the allowance of 
the use of such business entries were cogently stated in the Fifth Re-
port of the Judicial Council of Massachusetts.2 In its report for 1953 
the Judicial Council found no sufficient reason why such business 
entries should not be admissible in criminal proceedings as well, and 
said: 
In Massachusetts today, because of the uncertainty in the minds 
of the courts and the bar as to the admissibility of business entries, 
criminal trials are unduly extended and justice obstructed, de-
3 See Kenney, A Serious Change in the Method of Review in Criminal Cases, 39 
Mass. L.Q., No.2, p. 12 (1954). 
§15.8. 1 Pub. Doc. 144, pp. 32-35 (1952). 
~15.9. 1 C.L., c. 233, §78. 
2 Pub. Doc. 144, p. 21 (1929). 
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layed and, perhaps, defeated by the exclusion of modern business 
records on which everybody outside of a court house relies in 
conducting the business, public or private, throughout the coun-
try. Modern American business could not survive without such 
reliance. With the enormous increase and variety of circum-
stances in the modern world, the resulting variety of probative 
circumstantial evidence should, reasonably, be recognized. Public 
records are admissible and properly kept private business records 
should also be admissible if justice is to be administered in the 
courts instead of being driven out of courts to arbitration. We do 
not think the present practice of excluding them makes sense." 3 
The main objection raised to the extension of General Laws, Chap-
ter 233, Section 78 to criminal proceedings has been the right of the 
accused "to meet the witnesses against him face to face" guaranteed 
by the Twelfth Article of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. 
Cases involving similar statutes and constitutional provisions have on 
the whole dismissed such objection in the light of the commonly 
recognized probity of the type of entries mentioned in General Laws, 
Chapter 233, Section 78.4 
As a result of the recommendation of the Judicial Council, the 
Massachusetts legislature passed Chapter 442 of the Acts of 1954, 
amending General Laws, Chapter 233, Section 78, to extend the ad-
missibility in evidence of business entries to criminal proceedings 
and also provided that "when such entry, writing or record is ad-
mitted in a criminal proceeding all questions of fact which must be 
determined by the court as the basis for the admissibility of the evi-
dence involved shall be submitted to the jury, if a jury trial is had 
for its final determination." 
§15.10. Defective delinquents. After a study of the defective delin-
quent statutes of Massachusetts by the Special Commission on the 
Commitment, Care and Treatment of Criminally Insane and Defec-
tive Delinquents, it was reported that the following types of persons 
who have been confined as defective delinquents under General Laws, 
Chapter 123, Section 113 should not be so confined: (1) those who 
commit such minor offenses as larceny, vagrancy, and idle and dis-
orderly conduct, which do not represent danger to life or limb; 
(2) those who have engaged in refractory noncriminal conduct in 
penal institutions or training schools; (3) those who have presented 
problems of discipline in institutions for the feeble-minded. The 
commission recommended legislation 
to restrict the commitments to the Department of Defective De-
linquents to those who, in the opinion of competent psychiatrists, 
are mentally defective, and who have been found to be guilty of 
• Pub. Doc. 144, Twenty-ninth Report of the Judicial Council of Massachusetts 31, 
32 (1953). 
• Ibid. and cases cited. 
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offenses which are dangerous to life and limb. We see no justi-
fication for committing any other type of offender to so serious 
an incarceration. Experience has abundantly demonstrated that 
many a feeble-minded person who has in fact never committed a 
crime, has, because of refractory conduct, whether in an institu-
tion or in the community, been gotten rid of by way of the De-
fective Delinquent Department, with grave injury to the future 
development for good of the individual involved, and manifest 
injustice to his rights as a human being.1 
The Massachusetts legislature adopted this recommendation by 
passing Chapter 685 of the Acts of 1954 to take the place of Section 
113 of Chapter 123 of the General Laws. The new law limits the class 
of persons who can be committed as defective delinquents to those who 
have been charged with crimes dangerous to life and limb. A sepa-
rate paragraph in the section recites the types of crimes which may be 
considered dangerous to life or limb. 
Under the new act only a person who is subject to a prosecution 
may be committed as a defective delinquent. Thus, one who is in-
carcerated at a penal or correctional institution would have to commit 
a crime while he is in custody before he can be committed to the 
defective delinquent department. .Moreover, no longer maya "pro-
bation officer, officer of a penal institution or school for the feeble-
minded, or the youth service board" make application for commitment 
as provided in the old statute; the district attorney is the only person 
who may file such application. 
§15.11. Sex offenders. Public indignation often leads to the enact-
ment of ill-considered legislation which, when passions subside, often 
has to be repealed or substantially amended to make it workable or 
fair. As the result of publicized crimes of violence by "sex fiends," 
"perverts," or "degenerates," Massachusetts, following the lead of some 
Midwestern states, enacted in 1947 a so-called "sexual psychopath" 
statute, General Laws, Chapter 123A. It defined a "psychopathic 
personality" as "Those persons who by an habitual course of mis-
conduct in sexual matters have evidenced an utter lack of power to 
control their sexual impulses and who, as a result are likely to attack 
or otherwise inflict injury, loss, pain or other evil on the objects of 
their uncontrolled and uncontrollable desires." Statutes of this na-
ture have been criticized by medical and legal opinion, by criminolo-
gists, social workers, and administrators.1 
Some of the objectionable features of General Laws, Chapter 123A 
were removed by Chapter 686 of the Acts of 1954. The loose and 
§15.l0. 1 House Doc. 2780, Report of the Special Commission on the Commitment. 
Care and Treatment of Criminally Insane and Defective Delinquents 14. 15 (1954). 
§15.11. 1 See Curran, Commitment of Sex Offenders, 37 Mass. L.Q., No. I, p. 58 
(1952); Sutherland, The Sexual Psychopath Laws, 40 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 543 
(1949-1950); House Doc. 2780, Report of the Special Commission on the Commitment. 
Care and Treatment of Criminally Insane and Defective Delinquents 19 (1954). 
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controversial phrase, "psychopathic personality," was dropped and 
"sex offender" substituted. The "sex offender" is defined in sub-
stantially the same manner as the "psychopath" under the 1947 act 
with the difference that the course of misconduct in sexual matters 
need not be "habitual"; a "general lack of power to control ... sex 
impulses" replaces "an utter lack of power ... "; "uncontrolled and 
uncontrollable desires" is now put in the alternative, the word "or" 
being substituted for "and." 
Chapter 686 goes on to provide that, before any person may be com-
mitted as a sex offender, he must first have been convicted of one of 
certain named sex crimes, unlike the prior law where the "psychopath" 
did not have to be charged with any crime. 
Under the 1947 statute commitments were to be made by the Probate 
Court, while under the new act the commitment results after a report 
by psychiatrists certified by the Department of Mental Health to the 
effect that the one convicted of the named sex crime is a sex offender 
or that "a pattern of repetitive compulsive or violent behavior exists." 
The report is filed in the court where the subject was convicted and is 
forwarded to the Commissioner of Correction, who transfers the pris-
oner from the institution to which he has been sentenced to a treat-
ment center in the Department of Mental Health. 
If one under sentence in any penal or correctional institution ap-
pears to be a sex offender, the head of the institution is to report the 
matter to a judge of the Superior Court, who may commit the subject 
to the treatment center after an examination and report of psychiatrists 
certified by the Department of Mental Health and after a petition for 
that purpose is prepared by the district attorney. There are detailed 
provisions for notice, hearing, and representation by counsel. 
The earlier statute placed no limit on the duration of confinement 
of any person, but the new act provides that no person may be com-
mitted to the treatment center "for a period in excess of that provided 
by the sentence imposed upon him for the crime committed." How-
ever, Section 7 of the 1954 act provides for outpatient treatment for 
the sex offender after termination of his sentence if the court, after a 
hearing, so orders. These provisions of Chapter 686 may be compared 
with the defective delinquent statute Chapter 123, Section 113 where 
no maximum period of commitment is set out. 
Persons who are committed under Chapter 686 are entitled to a 
hearing for examination and discharge once every twelve months, upon 
filing a written petition. Provision is made for the Department of Men-
tal Health to make examinations every year and to give annual progress 
reports to the district attorney and the Superior Court. 
A person may voluntarily submit to treatment under the new law, 
and the facilities of the treatment center are made available to victims 
of sex offenders. 
The new act is to become operative when the Commissioner of Men-
tal Health determines that the newly created treatment center in the 
Department of Mental Health is adequately staffed. 
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